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Abstract: State-driven litigation has had increasing influence in the development of national 
policy in recent years, including in national health policy. One prominent recent example 
includes the efforts of several state governments to bring coordinated constitutional 
challenges against one of the Obama Administration’s key first term achievements, the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. This paper examines how states have influenced 
health care policy influence in a more subtle but no less important litigation campaign. Over 
the past decade, state prosecutors have reached numerous multi-million dollar settlements 
with the nation’s largest pharmaceutical companies imposing a variety of restrictions on 
prescription drug pricing and advertising. Though often relying upon state law claims, these 
settlements have created new de facto national standards covering the drug industry – 
frequently going beyond and even against express congressional action. Relying upon an 
analysis of numerous legal cases, investigations, and settlements, this paper traces the 
development of this persistent litigation campaign and discusses the wide policy implications 
state litigation has had in this area. In doing so, the paper raises important broader 
questions about the operation of modern American public policy. 
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A longstanding feature of the American political system is its 
remarkable fragmentation. Political power is distributed not only 
horizontally among the three main branches of government but 
vertically between the federal government and a myriad of state and 
local government actors. Despite increasing centralization of power in 
the federal government during the twentieth century, this significant 
structural fragmentation is kept alive by record levels of public 
mistrust of the federal government on both ends of the political 
spectrum. 
As many scholars have noted, this structural fragmentation has 
important consequences for public policy. Perhaps most importantly, it 
creates special political challenges in an era in which increasing 
political polarization combines with public demands for the government 
to solve problems. There have been suggestions that this political 
polarization and structural fragmentation is a recipe for perpetual 
gridlock, demanding a radical overhaul of the structure of the system.1 
Other scholars have highlighted how the many veto points available to 
opponents of policy change have led to attempts at "unorthodox 
lawmaking" in various venues.2 One of these methods of unorthodox 
lawmaking has been an increasing reliance on courts and litigation as a 
way to resolve disputes and implement public policy – a dynamic 
Robert Kagan has termed "adversarial legalism."3 
This paper examines an important yet underappreciated new 
development in the politics of adversarial legalism, one illustrating how 
the fragmentation of the American political system creates not just 
veto points and perpetual gridlock but "opportunity points" for policy 
development as well.4 In recent years, state prosecutors have become 
key opportunity points as they have increasingly turned to litigation 
consciously aimed at changing policy. Most famously, forty-six states 
negotiated a massive settlement with several tobacco firms in 1998 
that included not just massive payouts to the states but a host of new 
                                                          
1 Sanford Levinson, Our Democratic Constitution (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
2 Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking, 4th ed. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2011). 
3 Robert Kagan, Adversarial Legalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2001). 
4 The notion of "opportunity points" is borrowed from R. Shep Melnick, Between the 
Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights (Washington D.C.: Brookings Instit. Press, 1994): 
140-141. 
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regulatory requirements on the tobacco industry.5 The states’ more 
recent litigation campaigns have been at least as consequential as this 
earlier tobacco litigation. Several states have filed challenges to a 
variety of Obama Administration priorities, including most prominently 
the signature achievement of the Obama presidency to date – the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). During the George 
W. Bush Administration, several states brought lawsuits against the 
Environmental Protection Agency, eventually winning several key 
cases concerning climate change and acid rain policy.6  
Much state litigation, as with the tobacco litigation, has targeted 
private industry. In conjunction with federal prosecutors, for example, 
states have recently negotiated a giant $26 billion settlement with the 
nation’s largest banks concerning the banks’ role in the foreclosure 
crisis.7 In addition to the money involved, this settlement requires 
banks to change the way they service home loans and grants greater 
state oversight of federally regulated banks. Through litigation, the 
states have also targeted practices of Internet firms, major beverage 
manufacturers, the financial sector, and many other firms, wresting 
settlements imposing new regulatory requirements not required by 
federal regulators. Most importantly for the purposes of this paper, 
states have brought dozens of lawsuits against drug companies 
seeking not only monetary recoveries but important regulatory 
changes throughout the pharmaceutical industry. 
Whether targeting the federal government or private 
corporations, the effect and often the explicit intent of this state-driven 
litigation is to change public policy. State litigation against the federal 
government aims to nullify congressional enactments such as the 
PPACA or force federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency to change their regulatory posture. State litigation against 
large private corporations aims at reaching major settlements 
containing a mix of monetary and regulatory provisions. These 
settlements have succeeded in creating new de facto national 
                                                          
5 Martha Derthick, Up in Smoke: From Legislation to Litigation in Tobacco Politics 
(Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005). 
6 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
7 Nelson D. Schwartz and Shaila Dewan, "States Negotiate $26 Billion Agreement for 
Homeowners," New York Times, February 8, 2012. 
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standards covering a variety of industries – frequently going beyond 
and even against express congressional action.  
I focus on pharmaceutical litigation in this paper for a number of 
reasons. First, the developments I describe in this paper have been 
vitally important in the overall picture of health care policy – a policy 
area touching upon a significant percentage of the American economy. 
Through litigation conducted both independently and in conjunction 
with federal prosecutors and private litigators, states have subtly 
transformed the regulatory landscape for pharmaceutical products. 
This has been particularly true in the area of drug pricing and 
marketing. 
Second, the state-driven pharmaceutical litigation described in 
this paper is part of a larger dynamic in which states have increasingly 
turned to litigation to achieve their policy goals. As the examples 
briefly noted previously indicate, states have engaged in regulatory 
litigation in a variety of policy areas including environmental 
protection, consumer protection, and antitrust enforcement. They have 
sought (and achieved) stricter oversight of industries ranging from 
mortgage lenders to Internet firms. In many of these areas, the states 
have claimed that they were acting to fill "regulatory gaps" left open 
by congressional or administrative inaction on the federal level. 
Further, the emergence of state litigation in this area is a 
reminder of how policymaking in the fragmented American political 
system requires attention to the many interactions between different 
political institutions and different levels of government. Litigation, 
including state litigation, is best analyzed not in isolation but as part of 
the larger system of public policy in which developments on one level 
affect developments on another.8 Understanding how and why states 
have increasingly turned to litigation as a powerful regulatory tool 
requires examining the actions of other political actors in the political 
system, including Congress and federal administrative agencies. For 
scholars interested in the dynamics of contemporary policymaking and 
regulation, this development is a reminder to be mindful of the many 
                                                          
8 For other studies emphasizing the important of inter-branch relationships, see 
Thomas Burke, Lawyers, Lawsuits, and Legal Rights (Berkeley, CA: U. of California 
Press, 2002); Jeb Barnes, Overruled? Legislative Overrides, Pluralism, and 
Contemporary Court-Congress Relations (Stanford, CA: Stanford U. Press, 2004); 
Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S. 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010),,. 
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important and consequential complexities of the American political 
system. 
Lawyers, Drugs, and Money: Litigating 
Pharmaceutical Prices 
The health care sector represents one of the largest and fastest-
growing shares of the American economy, with total health care 
spending representing more than 17% of the United States' entire 
gross domestic product.9 A significant portion of this spending is 
associated with spending for pharmaceutical products, which reached 
$307 billion in 2010.10 This rapid rise in health care costs has led to 
health care policy emerging as one of the most hotly contested items 
on the political agenda in recent years.  
Because of the role prescription drugs have played as a driver of 
health care costs, pharmaceutical companies have increasingly come 
under the spotlight. The high cost of prescription drugs is of interest to 
state governments as well as the federal government because the 
Medicaid program, which provides medical care to those unable to pay 
for it, is jointly funded by both levels of government. Several members 
of Congress have suggested that the high costs of pharmaceuticals are 
the result of unscrupulous business practices, and several states have 
enacted legislation aimed at reducing the costs of prescription drugs 
for their residents.11 Perhaps the most consequential development, 
however, has been state efforts to regulate drug prices through 
litigation. 
 
  
                                                          
9 "Health Care's Share of U.S. Economy Rose at Record Rate," New York Times, 
February 4, 2010. 
10 Gary Gatyas, "IMS Institute Reports U.S. Spending on Medicines Grew 2.3 Percent 
in 2010, to $307.4 
Billion,”http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/ims/menuitem.d248e29c86589c9c30e8
1c033208c22a/?vgnextoid=24b2f14cddc40310VgnVCM10000071812ca2RCRD&vgnext
fmt=default. 
11 For a good overview of these state legislative efforts, see John Bentivoglio, 
Rosemary Maxwell, and Marc Stanislawczyk, "State Controls on Drug Costs: An Out-
of-Control Experiment in Federalism?" Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, October 
11, 2001. Also see Jill Wechler, "'War On Drugs' Attacks High Prices," Pharmaceutical 
Technology, June 2000, 14. 
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Prescription Drug Reimbursement in the Medicaid 
Program 
Before discussing these litigation efforts, it is important to 
understand the structure of Medicaid and how the program pays for 
prescription drugs. Unlike the federally funded and administered 
Medicare program, the health insurance program for the elderly, 
Medicaid places much of the responsibility for program operations on 
the states. Every state must create an agency to implement the 
Medicaid program, which is in turn overseen by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services within the Department of Health and 
Human Services ("HHS"). These state agencies are tasked with 
carrying out various details of program administration. 
As a joint federal/state venture, the funding for Medicaid 
services is also a shared responsibility between the two levels of 
government. The amount of the federal share for Medicaid payments 
varies from 50% to 76% of the total program costs, depending on the 
state. As of 2009, the total program costs for Medicaid totaled $373.9 
billion.12 These costs have risen rapidly over the course of Medicaid’s 
existence, driven in large part by the rapid increase in expenditures for 
pharmaceuticals. Unlike Medicare, which provided only a limited 
number of prescription drugs under the Part B health insurance 
program prior to the adoption of the Medicare Part D prescription drug 
benefit in 2005, Medicaid pays for a variety of prescription drugs for 
eligible individuals. Between 1997 and 2000, expenditures under 
Medicaid's drug benefit grew at an average annual rate of 18.1%, 
more than two times the 7.7% annual growth in total Medicaid 
spending.13 
Pharmaceutical companies are not reimbursed directly under 
Medicaid. Instead, health care providers (such as pharmacies) pay 
drug companies for the drugs and are then reimbursed by the 
government according to a pricing benchmark for each drug. In both 
the Medicaid and Medicare programs, this pricing benchmark has long 
been the "Average Wholesale Price" (AWP) of the drug. In theory, the 
                                                          
12 Center for Medicaid Services, "National Health Expenditures 2009 Highlights," 
accessed March 9, 2012, 
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf. 
13 Dawn M. Gencarelli, "Average Wholesale Price for Prescription Drugs: Is There a 
More Appropriate Pricing Mechanism?" National Health Policy Forum, June 7, 2002. 
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AWP is meant to reflect the average price at which wholesalers sell 
prescription drugs to physicians, pharmacies, and other customers. 
The AWP, however, has no statutory definition, and the states have 
relied upon commercial publishers of drug pricing data, the most 
prominent being First DataBank, for the AWPs of drugs covered by 
Medicaid. These commercial publishers in turn receive the AWP pricing 
information "based on data obtained from manufacturers, distributors, 
and other suppliers."14 In other words, the AWPs for any given drug 
have no set benchmark but instead originate from information 
provided by the manufacturers of that drug. Because of this 
manufacturer-reported pricing system, the AWP is akin to a "sticker 
price" or "list price" similar to those used in automobile sales. 
Because the term "AWP" is not defined in law or regulation, the 
manufacturer may set the AWP at any level, regardless of the actual 
price paid by purchasers. A major consequence of this pricing system 
is that it gives health care providers – whom the government 
reimburses for their drug purchases based upon the AWP benchmark – 
an incentive to prescribe drugs where the greatest difference exists 
between the listed AWP and the actual price they pay for the drug. 
This difference is often referred to as the "spread," which the providers 
can then use to bolster their own revenues. This, in turn, gives drug 
manufacturers an incentive to increase the spread by increasing the 
AWP benchmark they report to commercial drug price publishers such 
as First DataBank. By doing so, drug companies can encourage the 
utilization of their drugs by providing larger spreads to health care 
providers. 
The Clinton Administration Tries to Change the AWP 
Benchmark 
The government has long been aware of the potential that these 
incentives would drive up drug costs. As early as 1968, the Task Force 
on Prescription Drugs of the Department of Health Education and 
Welfare noted that the AWP could be used as an "umbrella" beneath 
which the [pharmaceutical] company can maneuver against competing 
products." In 1977, the Health Care Financing Administration (the 
predecessor to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services within 
                                                          
14 Ibid.; Medical Economics Staff, eds., Red Book, 106th ed. (Montvale, N.J.: Thomson 
Medical Economics, (2002), 169. 
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HHS) unsuccessfully tried to get states to move away from AWP. As 
concern about rising health care costs reached even higher levels in 
the 1990s, President Clinton noted the potential for higher costs to the 
government because of the flawed, but legal, AWP system. In a 1997 
address calling for additional efforts to reduce health care costs, 
Clinton explained the AWP system as an example of a type of "waste 
and abuse" that "aren't even illegal [because] they're just embedded 
in the practices of the system."15 For years, the difference between 
AWP and the actual market prices for drugs led pharmaceutical 
industry observers to refer to AWP as "Ain't What's Paid."16 
Despite these concerns, neither Congress nor the states 
replaced the use of the manufacturer-reported AWP benchmark. The 
reason had largely to do with the testimony of physicians, particularly 
oncologists, who argued that there would be no way for them to stay 
in business and serve Medicare and Medicaid recipients without 
benefiting from the "spread" created by the AWP.17 While the AWP 
indeed exceeded the providers' costs for drugs, the spread helped to 
make up for inadequate government payments related to other 
professional services provided under Medicare and Medicaid. 
 Congress was generally swayed by these arguments, 
particularly the prospect that AWP cuts would lead to more limited 
access to services available to Medicare and Medicaid enrollees. This 
was true even when the Clinton Administration made a significant push 
in the 1990s to alter the AWP system for the purposes Medicare drug 
reimbursements. In his 1998 budget proposal, Clinton proposed 
eliminating AWP and replacing it with a formula directly related to 
actual acquisition costs paid by providers. Congress rejected this 
proposal, instead making much less drastic changes to the drug 
reimbursement formula.18 The Administration subsequently fought for 
                                                          
15 James M. Spears and Jeff Pullman, "Using Litigation to Regulate Drug Prices: The 
Assault," Medical Marketing and Media, June 2002, 72. 
16 Paul E. Kalb, I. Scott Bass, and Robert Fabrikant, "The Average Wholesale Price: It 
"Ain't What the Government Wants to Pay,‟ Health Care Fraud Report, February 21, 
2001, 182. 
17 Terry Carter, "Drug Wars," ABA Journal, December 2002, 44. 
18 Public Law No. 105-33 §4556(a), 11 Stat. 251 (1997). Also see "Plan Targets 
Medicare Waste to Save Billions," Washington Post, December 7, 1998, A2; Joan H. 
Krause, "A Conceptual Model of Health Care Fraud Enforcement," Journal of Law and 
Policy, 127 (2004). 
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larger tweaks to the AWP payment system in both 1999 and 2000, but 
neither of these proposals gained traction in Congress. 
The Fight Moves from Congress to the Courts 
Amidst these failed attempts at statutory changes of the AWP 
formula in Congress, the Clinton Administration DOJ, along with 
several states, began shifting to a litigation strategy by investigating 
the use of AWP by certain pharmaceutical companies. The 
investigation, which focused on the activities of more than a dozen 
large pharmaceutical firms, examined the way in which drug 
companies "marketed the spread" between AWP and actual costs to 
provide incentives to providers to prescribe their products and apply 
for reimbursements under Medicare and Medicaid. According to the 
government prosecutors, this practice represented actionable fraud. 
One letter from New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer to Medicaid 
pharmacy directors across the country announced that this 
investigation "has revealed a pattern of misrepresentation by some 
drug manufacturers" resulting in Medicare and Medicaid "substantially" 
overpaying for certain drugs.19 This "misrepresentation" was the use of 
allegedly inflated AWP information reported by manufacturers to the 
commercial publishers of drug pricing data. 
The governments' first step was to pressure First DataBank, the 
largest of these commercial publishers, to alter the way it reported 
prices for several dozen prominent drugs. In the face of the growing 
federal/state investigation, the company agreed in 2000 to list prices 
that the state prosecutors determined were closer to what providers 
actually paid for the drugs. Following this informal agreement, Spitzer 
noted that this pricing change would likely result in "initial complaints 
or objections about lowered Medicaid payments" by providers,20 which 
is precisely what occurred when the Health Care Financing 
Administration announced plans to use these new rates reported by 
First DataBank to compensate providers. 
Following the predicted outrage from health care providers, 
particularly oncologists worried about reimbursement rates under 
Medicare, Congress enacted the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP 
Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000. This act, among 
                                                          
19 Julie Appleby, "Drug Pricing Probed," USA Today, April 6, 2000, 1A. 
20 Ibid. 
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other things, precluded the HHS Secretary from "directly or indirectly 
decreas[ing] the rates or reimbursement...under the current 
reimbursement methodology" until the General Accounting Office 
released a study on the matter of AWP and it was reviewed by HHS.21 
With Congress clearly hesitant to proceed with any significant 
changes to the AWP system, state and federal prosecutors pressed 
ahead with their investigation. The government coalition reported that 
it had uncovered a variety of "fraudulent" behavior by the 
pharmaceutical companies that had ultimately cost the federal and 
state governments billions of dollars. Some of the activity was the sort 
of garden-variety fraud the states had been prosecuting for years. 
Central to the investigation, however, was the notion that marketing 
the "spread" between the drug's listed AWP and the actual cost of that 
drug represented illegal fraud. 22 
The government coalition made clear that it was willing to turn 
to active litigation if necessary to recover government funds expended 
because of this alleged AWP fraud. The governments' legal hook relied 
upon an innovative use of the False Claims Act ("FCA"), a Civil War-era 
statute that originally aimed to crack down on "rampant fraud" among 
defense contractors doing business with the Union army.23 The 
prospect of FCA liability was particularly disturbing for pharmaceutical 
firms, since every filled Medicare or Medicaid prescription might be 
considered a "false claim" subject to treble damages and the 
maximum penalty under the statute. These penalties could quickly add 
up to create potential exposure to these firms running into the 
hundreds of millions of dollars. Additionally, if a company was found 
guilty of any criminal violations involved in a potential suit, the 
company could be excluded from Medicare and other federal health 
programs, a penalty some have described as a corporate "death 
sentence."24 Under these conditions, drug companies quickly realized 
                                                          
21 §429(c) of the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection 
Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-554). 
22 Julie Appleby, "Drugmakers Accused of 'Unethical' Pricing," USA Today, September 
27, 2000, 3B. 
23 Joan H. Krause, "A Conceptual Model of Health Care Fraud Enforcement," Journal of 
Law and Policy 12 (2004): 65. 
24 Christopher D. Zalesky, "Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: Balancing Public 
Health and Law Enforcement Interests, Moving Beyond Regulation-Through-Litigation," 
Journal of Health Law 39(2): 235-264 (2006).  
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that litigating any government claims all the way to a jury verdict 
would be very risky and potentially fatal to the corporations. 
The Precedent for "AWP as Fraud" – the Bayer and TAP 
Pharmaceuticals Settlements 
State and federal prosecutors understood the potential leverage 
they maintained over potential drug company defendants because of 
their FCA claims, and made no secret of the fact that they sought to 
force a settlement with a major manufacturer in the hope that it would 
set a precedent for other companies to move towards a more accurate 
pricing system.25 In January of 2001, the government coalition 
achieved its first major victory. Since May of the previous year, the 
group had been in talks with Bayer Pharmaceuticals over the pricing of 
several its drugs used to treat hemophilia and AIDS. The government 
prosecutors alleged that Bayer was "marketing the spread" to 
physicians and other health care providers and that the company had 
inflated the cost of drugs under Medicaid. 
Essentially, the governments argued that the way that Bayer 
calculated the AWP for these drugs represented fraudulent actions 
leading to liability under the FCA. Bayer, along with the rest of the 
industry, argued that setting prices for AWP was in no way 
"fraudulent" given that the government had known for years that 
marketing the spread was an accepted industry practice and 
nevertheless kept AWP as part of the government reimbursement 
system. Nevertheless, under pressure from threatened litigation, Bayer 
decided to settle the governments' allegations. In separate but closely 
related settlements, the DOJ and the states reached an agreement 
with Bayer containing a small monetary payment of $14 million to be 
divided up between the federal government and the 45 states involved 
in the suit. Reflecting the ambitions of the governments to use the 
settlement to send a message to the pharmaceutical about the legality 
of AWP, however, the importance of the regulatory requirements in the 
settlement overshadowed the relatively minor monetary payments. 
The key provision of the settlement required Bayer to report the 
"average sale price" (ASP) for all of the drugs reimbursed by Medicaid 
                                                          
25 David S. Cloud and Laurie McGinley, "U.S., States, Bayer Start Settlement Talks," 
Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2000, A3. 
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rather than the AWPs for each of these drugs.26 In contrast to AWP, 
this new pricing benchmark was defined in the settlement as the 
weighted average of all non-Federal sales of drugs to wholesalers, 
including all discounts, rebates, and other benefits tied to the purchase 
of the drug. Because the ASP, unlike the AWP, was a defined term and 
set by the market rather than by the manufacturer, this was intended 
to reduce the sort of price "manipulation" by the pharmaceutical 
industry involved in these cases. Because companies could not create 
a spread between the AWP and market prices, the aim was to reduce 
costs of drugs reimbursed under government health care programs. 
State Medicaid officials would be able to use the ASP data to set "fair" 
reimbursement rates for prescription drugs. 
The government prosecutors viewed the Bayer settlement as a 
watershed agreement that could be used to replace the existing AWP 
system with the "more accurate" ASP system. New York Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer characterized the settlement as "a significant 
victory...[that] sends a strong message to other pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and health care providers that we will not allow them to 
enrich themselves at the expense of taxpayers and those most in 
need."27 This "strong message" resonated across the industry, as 
Bayer was but the first domino to fall in the government prosecutors' 
strategy to attack the AWP reimbursement system.  
The next domino was an even more significant agreement later 
in 2001 involving TAP Pharmaceuticals and their cancer drug, Lupron. 
In this case, the governments alleged that TAP engaged in a wide 
range of illegal conduct, some of which appeared to be clear fraud 
under existing federal statutes. This included allegations that TAP had 
offered kickbacks to doctors to encourage them to prescribe TAP’s 
products, in violation of federal law. 
However, as with the Bayer case, the allegations also included 
as evidence of "fraud" TAP's marketing the spread between its 
published AWPs for Lupron and the actual purchase price. As with 
                                                          
26 Corporate Integrity Agreement between the Office of Inspector General of the 
Department of Health and Human Services and Bayer Corporation (January 23, 2001), 
11–12, accessed March 17, 2012, 
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/BayerCorporation120301.PDF. 
27 Robert Pear, "Bayer to Pay $14 Million to Settle Charges of Causing Inflated 
Medicaid Claims," New York Times, January 24, 2001, A16. 
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Bayer, the TAP allegations aimed to introduce the notion that the AWP 
payment system was inherently fraudulent. This was despite the fact, 
as TAP argued, that "marketing the spread" and similar practices 
concerning AWP had been legal for years – and that Congress had 
even considered the spread an acceptable way to ensure that 
physicians and other providers remain in the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs. 
However, the government prosecutors saw in the TAP case an 
opportunity to make the statement that they had begun with Bayer. 
Despite the legally questionable nature of these AWP claims in the 
case, none of which had previously been tested in court, the 
accusations of other illegal kickbacks and other violations of federal 
law were on firmer legal ground. Because these charges could lead to 
criminal as well as civil liability if proven in court, TAP faced the 
prospect of exclusion from Medicare and other federal health 
programs.  
The threat of this "death sentence" gave the federal and state 
prosecutors additional leverage to force a significant settlement related 
to not only the kickback claims, but the alleged AWP fraud as well. In 
October of 2001, the strategy came to fruition in the form of a massive 
$875 million settlement between TAP and the government prosecutors, 
the largest health care fraud settlement in history to that time.28 As 
part of the settlement, TAP also entered into an agreement requiring 
strict oversight of TAP’s marketing and sales practices for seven years, 
the first ever settlement to require this sort of strict scrutiny. Perhaps 
most importantly of all, the settlement required TAP to report the ASP 
for each of its drugs on a quarterly basis, similar to the provision the 
prosecutors had won in the Bayer settlement. The settlement also 
permitted the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to rely 
upon this ASP data in setting reimbursement rates for TAP's products 
under Medicare as well as by state Medicaid programs in setting their 
own reimbursements rates.29 This settlement provision therefore 
allowed the CMS to go beyond its explicit authority established by 
                                                          
28 Department of Justice, "TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc. and Seven Others 
Charged With Health Care Crimes." 
29 Settlement Agreement Between the United States and TAP Pharmaceutical Products, 
Inc. (September 28, 2001), at §III.D.2.d. 
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Congress, which had specifically set Medicare reimbursement rates 
using AWP as the pricing formula. 
The Floodgates Open and the States Rush In 
These two settlements were viewed as watershed cases and a 
"wake-up call" throughout the industry. As one health care fraud 
attorney stated at the time, "[t]he TAP settlement sent a huge chill 
through the pharmaceutical industry."30 Not only did the size of the 
TAP settlement raise eyebrows throughout the pharmaceutical 
industry, but both the Bayer and TAP settlements introduced the 
notion that the AWP pricing mechanism, which had long been seen as 
standard company practice, was inherently fraudulent. 
State prosecutors fully understood that the Bayer and TAP 
precedents opened up additional opportunities for state litigation. As 
former Maine AG Andrew Ketterer stated at the time, "the area [of 
AWP] is fertile for attorneys general to look into. Pharmaceutical 
companies spend a fair amount of money on research and 
development for wells that don't have oil and they have to recover 
from those losses in some way. [A lawsuit] is not out of the range of 
possibilities that would come on to the radar screen. It's an area that 
is of great interest to a lot of people."31 
Attorney General Ketterer's words proved prescient, because 
states began litigating AWP suits independently of the federal 
government during and especially shortly after the Bayer and TAP 
settlements were announced. Republican Texas AG John Cornyn, in 
the midst of the Bayer and TAP investigations, filed the first state AWP 
lawsuit in the fall of 2000. Similar to the allegations in the Bayer and 
TAP cases, this state lawsuit alleged that three pharmaceutical firms 
had inflated the AWP for asthma inhalants and marketed the spread to 
pharmacists.32  
The suit had a near-immediate effect on how Texas reimbursed 
drugs under its Medicaid program. Shortly after Cornyn filed the case, 
the head of Texas's Medicaid program ordered an audit of its drug 
                                                          
30 Pamela M. Prah, "Fraud Cops Target Drug Makers, Clinical Trials," Kiplinger Business 
Forecasts, April 9, 2002 (quoting David E. Matyas, a lawyer specializing in health care 
fraud in the law firm of Epstein Becker & Green). 
31 Guiden, "States Mull Suit." 
32 Ibid. 
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reimbursements, and soon after cut the reimbursement rates for the 
drugs involved in the suit. Eventually, all three defendants named in 
Texas's AWP lawsuit reached settlements with the Attorney General's 
office. These settlements included combined monetary recoveries of 
over $55 million, representing nearly twice the damages allegedly 
caused by the defendant's "inflating" their drug prices.  The 
settlements also required the defendants to enter into pricing 
agreements with the state Medicaid division to ensure "accurate" 
pricing in the future.33 
A number of other attorneys general across the country 
piggybacked on Texas’s pioneering efforts by bringing expansive AWP 
lawsuits of their own. In January of 2002, Nevada AG Frankie Sue Del 
Papa filed a suit in Nevada state court accusing seventeen 
pharmaceutical companies of inflating the AWPs and thus driving up 
the costs of Nevada's Medicaid program. Del Papa's lawsuit went well 
beyond that of Cornyn's in Texas. Not only did the state name a 
broader range of defendants, but the complaint listed a variety of 
Medicaid fraud, antitrust, and consumer protection claims in the 
lawsuit.34 In addition to allegedly employing "deceptive practices" 
constituting consumer fraud that harmed Nevada residents and the 
state budget, Nevada alleged that the companies' behavior also 
constituted a "racketeering enterprise" aimed at deriving profits from 
states across the nation by inflating AWPs.35 "We're trying to assert 
every possible claim of relief," stated Tim Terry, the chief of the 
Nevada Medicaid fraud unit.36 The complaint also repeatedly referred 
to the pharmaceutical companies' behavior as part of an "AWP 
Scheme," a seeming attempt to coin a negative label for pricing 
behavior that had for decades been part of the government's 
reimbursement practice. 
Del Papa explained her rationale for filing the lawsuit by noting 
that "[t]his country and our state have struggled to provide cost-
effective health care while the elderly are often forced to choose 
expensive medicines over food and housing." In Howard Beale-esqe 
                                                          
33 See, for example, Settlement Agreement and Release, State of Texas v. Roxane 
Laboratories, No. GV3-03079 (District Court of Travis County, Texas), III(3). 
34 Complaint For Injunctive Relief (State of Nevada v. Abbott Laboratories), Counts I-
VII. 
35 Ibid., Count IV. 
36 Caffrey, "States Go To Court." 
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terms, she remarked, "[t]oday, we have fired the first salvo sending a 
message on behalf of our state and our citizens that we aren't going to 
take it anymore."37 In addition to requesting damages of "three times 
the amount unlawfully obtained" and at least $5,000 for each allegedly 
false claim – monetary recoveries that could easily reach at least into 
the tens of millions – the complaint also asked for a redefinition of 
AWP. Rather than continuing with the long-settled notion that AWP 
represented the manufacturer-defined "sticker price" for prescription 
drugs, the complaint requested "the Court enjoin defendants and order 
that any and all future disseminations of AWP...accurately reflect the 
average wholesale prices paid by physicians and pharmacies." Del 
Papa noted that the breadth of the complaint meant that her litigation 
"has nationwide applications because of its similarities to the historic 
tobacco litigation in which the states eventually recovered billions of 
dollars."38 
A month after Nevada's lawsuit, Montana AG Mike McGrath filed 
similar litigation. This state court lawsuit alleged very similar charges 
against eighteen defendants, most of whom Nevada's suit also 
targeted. Like Nevada's complaint, Montana's alleged the AWPs 
reported by the pharmaceutical manufacturers bore little or no 
relationship to prices actually paid by physicians or pharmacies in the 
state.39 The complaint also contained a variety of causes of action, 
seeking civil penalties of $2,000 per false claim, double damages, and 
legal costs and fees.40 As with the Nevada lawsuit, the Montana 
complaint also asked the court to "enjoin Defendants and order that 
any and all future disseminations of AWP…accurately reflect the 
average wholesale prices paid by physicians and pharmacies." 
Subsequent Lawsuits and Litigation Successes 
Building upon this earliest multistate AWP litigation, which also 
included West Virginia, the quantity of litigation expanded, both in 
terms of the number of states involved in bringing lawsuits as well as 
                                                          
37 Dana A. Elfin, "Nevada Sues Drug Companies to Recover Millions of Dollars in 
Alleged Overpayments," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, January 24, 2002. 
38 Elfin, "Nevada Sues Drug Companies." 
39 Ibid. 
40 Complaint For Injunctive Relief, Damages, Restitution, Disgorgement, Penalties and 
Other Relief and Demand for Jury Trial, State of Montana v. Abbott Laboratories, et al 
(First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County), Count V. 
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the number of defendants involved in the lawsuits. Table 1 indicates 
the progression of these lawsuits over time. 
TABLE 1: AWP-RELATED STATE MEDICAID FRAUD LAWSUITS (THROUGH 
2010) 
 
State Date Filed Defendants 
Texas September 2000 
Dey Laboratories, Schering-Plough, and 
Roxane 
West Virginia October 2001 Schering-Plough and Abbott Labs 
Nevada January 2002 17 defendants 
Montana January 2002 18 defendants 
Minnesota June 2002 Pharmacia 
California January 2003 
Abbott Labs  
(expanded to 39 defendants in September 
2005) 
New York February 2003 Pharmacia and GlaxoSmithKline 
Connecticut March 2003 7 defendants 
Florida July 2003 
3 defendants  
(amended to included three others in April 
2005) 
Kentucky September 2003 5 defendants 
Massachusetts October 2003 13 defendants 
Arkansas January 2004 4 defendants 
Ohio March 2004 5 defendants 
Pennsylvania March 2004 13 (later expanded to 38) 
Wisconsin June 2004 20 defendants 
Kentucky November 2004 41 defendants 
Alabama January 2005 72 defendants 
Illinois February 2005 48 defendants 
Missouri May 2005 
Dey and Warrick  
(expanded to 4 others in December 2005) 
Mississippi October 2005 86 defendants 
Arizona December 2005 42 defendants 
Hawaii April 2006 44 defendants 
Alaska October 2006 44 defendants 
Idaho January 2007 18 defendants 
Utah September 2007 10 defendants 
Iowa October 2007 78 defendants 
Kansas November 2008 17 defendants 
Louisiana November 2010 18 defendants 
 
While states brought most of these suits in individual state 
courts under state law, they collaborated closely on these cases. The 
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key organizational mechanism was the Pharmaceutical Task Force 
established in 2002 under the auspices of the National Association of 
Attorneys General (NAAG). The goal of this Task Force was to 
encourage communication and collaboration among the states and 
accelerate and coordinate investigation and litigation efforts with other 
states, federal enforcement agencies, and the private bar.41 The 
coordination achieved with this NAAG Task Force helps explain the 
similarity of the various state lawsuits brought against pharmaceutical 
companies. 
In addition to these state lawsuits, a wave of private party 
lawsuits also emerged at the same time. This litigation involved a 
number of patients, private insurers, labor unions, health care 
advocates, and others. Many of these groups coordinated their 
litigation under the direction of the "Prescription Access Project," a 
coalition of over one hundred organizations founded in 2001 "working 
to end illegal pharmaceutical industry practices and fighting for more 
affordable drug prices."42 This private litigation attacked the same 
general AWP practices as the state lawsuits. 
 Faced with a growing plethora of similar state and private party 
lawsuits, the defendants sought to consolidate the claims in federal 
court. Many of the states’ lawsuits, including those of Nevada, 
Montana, and several others, were consolidated along with many of 
the private claims in a massive lawsuit in federal district court in 
Massachusetts, in a case known as In Re Pharmaceutical Industry 
Average Wholesale Price Litigation.43 This litigation continued for 
years, with the state plaintiffs winning several key motions. Perhaps 
most importantly of all, in November of 2006 Judge Patti Saris adopted 
the definition of AWP the states had urged. For the purposes of the 
upcoming trial in the case, the pharmaceutical defendants had wanted 
AWP to be defined as a term of art – as the "sticker price" that the 
industry had long assumed AWP meant under federal drug 
reimbursement practice. Instead, the court held that "[d]etermining 
                                                          
41 Meredyth Smith Andrus, Robert L. Hubbard, and Paul Novak, "State Attorneys 
General: Efforts to Address the High Costs of Prescription Drugs," ABA Section of 
Antitrust Law, accessed March 18, 2012, http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-
committees/at-state/pdf/publications/other-pubs/highcostofdrugs.pdf. 
42 Prescription Access Litigation, "PAL Coalition," accessed March 11, 2012, 
http://www.prescriptionaccess.org/about?id=0003. 
43 Pharmaceutical Average Wholesale Price Litigation, Docket No. 01-CV-12257-PBS, 
MDL No. 1456. 
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the plain language meaning of the regulatory and statutory term 
'average wholesale price' is a straightforward exercise that begins with 
the dictionary."44 Using the "plain meaning" of the term meant that 
AWP should be defined as the average price at which wholesalers sell 
drugs to their customers – precisely the definition that the state 
plaintiffs sought.45 This key decision undercut the companies' 
contention that AWP was in fact "Ain't What's Paid." 
 The states also secured a number of multistate and individual-
state settlements with many industry defendants as the In Re 
Pharmaceutical Industry litigation continued. GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) 
was the first defendant to resolve the claims it faced in the In Re 
Pharmaceutical Industry litigation, entering into settlements with five 
states and a number of private litigants concerning allegedly inflated 
AWPs for two of the company's cancer medications, Zofran and Kytril. 
In addition to a $70 million monetary payment split between the 
various plaintiffs, the company was also required to report the ASPs 
for the two drugs to the states' Medicaid programs. Gaining this 
information was critical to the states, since these prices, which were 
not previously available, could form a new baseline for Medicaid 
reimbursements in these states. Combined with an earlier settlement 
with GSK, these settlements were viewed by one of the private 
plaintiffs as "a nail in the coffin of AWP and a move toward a more 
transparent system that will prevent drug companies from charging 
inflated prices that have no relation to the actual cost of a drug."46 
Eliot Spitzer described the lawsuit as helping "stop a longstanding 
practice that inflated the cost of drugs for people suffering from cancer 
and cheated the Medicaid system."47 
Shortly after GSK settled, other defendants involved in the 
federal district court case followed suit. This included AstraZeneca in 
May of 2007 regarding Zolodex, and eleven other companies in March 
of 2008. Many of these settlements were precipitated by a victory on 
the merits by several of the private plaintiffs in one part of the In Re 
                                                          
44 "As Drug Pricing Trial Begins, Judge Says Meaning of 'Average Wholesale Price' 
Plain," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, November 10, 2006, 1167. 
45 Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, In Re Pharmaceutical Industry Average 
Wholesale Price Litigation, M.D.L. No. 1456 (D. Mass, June 21, 2007), 144. 
46 Martha Kessler, "GSK Pays $70 Million to Settle Lawsuit Alleging Artificial Inflation of 
Drug Prices," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, August 18, 2006, 909. 
47 Office of the New York Attorney General, "Leading Pharmaceutical Company 
Settles." 
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Pharmaceutical Industry consolidated federal case. In a ruling handed 
down in July 2007, Judge Saris held that the industry defendants 
"unfairly and deceptively caused to be published false AWPs...knowing 
that [third party payers] and the government did not understand the 
extent of the mega-spreads between published prices and true 
average provider acquisition costs." Saris adopted the characterization 
of the companies' activities as an "AWP Scheme," finding that the 
companies' "[u]nscrupulously taking advantage of the flawed AWP 
system for Medicare reimbursement by establishing secret mega-
spreads far beyond the standard industry markup was unethical and 
oppressive...[causing] real injuries to the insurers and the patients 
who were paying grossly inflated prices for critically important, often 
life-sustaining, drugs."48 Following this order, several of the states' 
cases consolidated in the lawsuit settled out-of-court.49 
AWP litigation continues to this day, with states reaching 
individual and multistate settlements with pharmaceutical company 
defendants. While the days of the AWP benchmark may be numbered 
largely because of these lawsuits, AWP litigation will likely continue, 
especially since the government has stated that drug prices are still 
inflated.50 Indeed, the states have worked closely together to settle 
several multi-million dollar multistate lawsuits throughout the past few 
years. 
AWP Litigation as Political Strategy 
Throughout the AWP litigation campaign conducted by the states 
and other parties over the past decade, the states made no secret that 
they were attempting to alter practices in the pharmaceutical industry 
on a national scale. As Ohio Attorney General Betty Montgomery 
stated in reference to the states' pharmaceutical litigation, "[o]ur 
major task is to change behavior. Money is incidental." Another 
observer noted that in this AWP litigation, state prosecutors were 
"filing cases where they know full well it's not clear that they can win if 
                                                          
48 Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, In Re Pharmaceutical Industry, 144. Also 
see "Court Says Rx Companies Engaged in Unfair Pricing Practices by Inflating Average 
Prices," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, June 29, 2007, 667. 
49 See, for example, Richard Vanderford, "Teva to Pay $315M to Settle Price Inflation 
Suits," Law 360, February 5, 2010 (noting that "Teva joins several drug companies 
that have already settled the AWP legislation"). 
50 James Swann, "Medicaid Payments Still Inflated for Many Drugs, OIG Report Finds," 
Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, January 22, 2010, 96. 
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they go to trial...they're not seeking damages in many of these 
situations – they're seeking structured settlements."51  
Through these lawsuits and settlements, the states sought to 
change the long-standing industry practice of using AWP as an 
incentive for health care providers to prescribe their prescription drug 
products – a practice Congress repeatedly countenanced as a way to 
compensate providers for losses incurred by their provision of other 
services under Medicare and Medicaid. For all of the flaws in the 
system, the industry relied upon and accepted this practice. "Three or 
four years ago, if you surveyed manufacturers and asked if AWPs were 
kickbacks," stated one attorney for the industry following the TAP 
settlement, "they'd have looked at you like you were from another 
planet."52 Yet through this explosion of litigation and settlements, the 
states (in conjunction with federal prosecutors and private litigants in 
several cases) have transformed the meaning of "health care fraud" to 
mean something completely different from what Congress and the 
industry alike understood it to mean for decades. 
This litigation campaign occurred as policy advocates for stricter 
price controls on prescription drugs attempted to alter the way 
government provided reimbursement prescription drugs both on the 
national level and in the states. A Maine statute enacted in 2000 
placed price controls on drugs sold in the state, making it "illegal 
profiteering" for a drug manufacturer to charge a price that is 
"unconscionable" or produces an "unjust or unreasonable profit." Other 
states, including Indiana, attempted to cut Medicaid reimbursement 
rates paid to pharmacies unilaterally. These state legislative and 
administrative strategies, however, faced the problem that their 
impact was limited to individual states, as well as the fact that these 
policy developments were frequently challenged in court. Courts 
granted injunctions to stop states from unilateral cuts in 
reimbursement rates, for example, and the Maine price control law and 
similar statutes were challenged in court by the pharmaceutical 
                                                          
51 "New Cops on the Beat," Institutional Investor Magazine, July 24, 2002; Reed 
Abelson and Jonathan D. Glater, "New York Will Sue 2 Big Drug Makers on Doctor 
Discount," New York Times, February 13, 2003, A1. 
52 Carter, "Drug Wars," at 44. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
2012 Midwest Political Science Conference, Chicago, IL, April 12-15, 2012, This article is © Midwest Political Science 
Association and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Midwest Political 
Science Association does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Midwest Political Science Association. 
22 
 
industry's peak association, PhRMA.53 Meanwhile, industry critics in 
Congress were losing their battle to end AWP on a national level, 
winning only modest reductions in prescription drug reimbursement 
rates. 
The campaign to redefine AWP by means of litigation solved 
both problems by sidestepping Congress to force drug pricing changes 
throughout the entire industry. In many of these cases, the states 
teamed up with both private class action attorneys and public interest 
groups to attack AWP as fraudulent and attempt to change the pricing 
benchmark from the previously long-standing practice. The litigation 
was also an attempt to obtain more information about drug prices, 
which could be used both in future litigation as well as to alter the 
states' payments for drugs. Texas's AWP litigation provides an 
example of this, with the state Medicaid agency relying upon the 
"accurate transaction prices" obtained by the Texas AG through 
settlements to set the new reimbursement benchmark for state 
Medicaid payments.54 
Further, these lawsuits continued to exert more pressure on 
Congress to address alleged "regulatory lapses" in the area of drug 
pricing. As noted earlier, Congress had declined to change the AWP 
system for years. However, as government prosecutors reached 
significant settlements with Bayer and TAP, and AWP litigation 
proliferated in courtrooms all around the country, Congress finally 
acted. In the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and 
Modernization Act, signed into law in December of 2003, Congress 
addressed the issue of prescription drug reimbursement under 
Medicare. The provisions intended to reduce Medicare’s reimbursement 
rates for physician-administered prescription drugs while at the same 
time increasing reimbursement rates for the services associated with 
administering those drugs.55  
                                                          
53 For a good overview, see John Bentivoglio, Rosemary Maxwell, and Marc 
Stanislawczyk, "State Controls on Drug Costs: An Out-of-Control Experiment in 
Federalism?" Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, October 11, 2001. 
54 Sugerman-Brozan and Woolman, "Drug Spending and the Average Wholesale Price" 
("States stick with AWP because they do not have access to more accurate information 
and they do not have the capacity to collect it themselves"). 
55 Covington & Burling, "Average Wholesale Price Reform Provisions of the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003," December 11, 2003, 
accessed March 11, 2012, http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/2533fcae-e193-44a9-
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Most importantly, Congress changed the pricing benchmark 
from AWP to the "Average Sales Price" – precisely the benchmark 
state and federal prosecutors had devised in the Bayer and TAP 
settlements and that various states cited in their own individual 
lawsuits and settlements. Under the Medicare Modernization Act, 
Congress set the new prescription drug reimbursement for Medicare at 
106% of ASP. The Act defined ASP in the same way as did the Bayer 
and TAP settlements – as an average
 
of the final sales prices to all U.S. 
purchasers, net of rebates and other discounts. Congress also required 
companies participating in the Medicare program to report the ASPs for 
their drugs to CMS on a quarterly basis, similar to the provisions 
previously achieved in the Bayer and TAP settlements.56 These 
congressional changes came only after the concerted litigation 
campaign by government prosecutors and a series of settlements 
provided a model for later statutory changes. 
In short, the states' AWP litigation, along with the federal and 
private lawsuits, had several effects on the industry. For one, it was 
part of a concerted campaign to redefine the existing AWP system as 
industry "fraud," despite neither Congress nor state Medicaid agencies 
electing to change the system. Second, through a series of 
settlements, states were able to achieve regulatory settlements 
creating an alternative pricing benchmark and placing additional 
pricing disclosure requirements on drug firms. Third, following these 
successful settlements, Congress reacted not by preempting the 
litigation for encroaching upon its legislative jurisdiction and 
threatening previously agreed-upon congressional policies. Instead, 
Congress ratified several of the elements previously contained in these 
settlements. The result has been the gradual decline of AWP as a 
pricing benchmark, a policy change with implications reverberating 
throughout the health care industry. 
  
                                                          
befc cb5a28d97c64/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/62931884-6610-481d-a563 
e0880edf15f6/oid9743.pdf. 
56 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Public 
Law 108-173, U.S. Statutes at Large 117 (2003): 2067, codified at 42 U.S.C. 
1395w(3)(a). 
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Standing in for the FDA: Litigating Pharmaceutical Advertising 
In addition to seeking dramatic changes in government drug 
reimbursements, states have also sought to regulate the advertising 
and marketing of pharmaceutical products through litigation 
strategies. Like the drug pricing litigation, this litigation effort is 
premised on the notion that certain actions by pharmaceutical firms 
have driven up the cost of prescription drugs. Also like the pricing 
litigation, state litigation has employed a sue-and-settlement strategy 
that has achieved numerous regulatory changes that have resonated 
throughout the industry and in Congress, ultimately resulting in 
stricter regulation of pharmaceutical advertising. Much of this activity 
has occurred even as both Congress and the Food and Drug 
Administration, which retains the primary responsibility of regulating 
prescription drug advertisements, have loosened restrictions on 
pharmaceutical advertising to doctors and consumers. 
Loosening Federal Restrictions on Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertising and Off-Label Marketing 
State litigation concerning pharmaceutical marketing has 
focused on two key forms of pharmaceutical marketing: direct-to-
consumer (or "DTC") advertising and off-label marketing. DTC 
advertising strategies, as the name suggests, focus on marketing 
pharmaceuticals to consumers through broadcast and print media as 
opposed to solely focusing marketing efforts on doctors and other 
health care providers. DTC advertising became much more prominent 
in the United States beginning in the 1980s. This was due in part to 
the decision of the Reagan Administration’s FDA to adopt a relatively 
"hands-off" approach to DTC advertisement regulation, after some 
initial consumer-related concerns, because of the agency’s conclusion 
that restrictions would violate the First Amendment and because the 
agency believed that existing federal law provided adequate consumer 
protections. 
Most DTC advertisements throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
remained in print due to a FDA requirement that all advertisements 
aimed at consumers include all warnings, precautions, and adverse 
side effects of the drug. These requirements made short broadcast 
advertisements all but impossible. In the mid-1990s, the FDA began to 
reevaluate this policy, and in 1997 the FDA released new guidelines to 
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the pharmaceutical industry entitled "Guidance for Industry: 
Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements."57 This guidance 
clarified existing regulations concerning broadcast advertising of 
prescription drugs, making clear that pharmaceutical firms were no 
longer required to state every warning and side effect associated with 
the drug. Instead, the advertisements need only grant consumers 
"reasonably convenient access to the advertised product's approved 
labeling" through a telephone number, website, or referral to a 
healthcare professional.58  
This FDA Guidance made it much easier for pharmaceutical 
firms to advertise their products in the broadcast media and helped 
lead to a sharp increase in DTC ads overall. For example, one study 
found that DTC advertising increased by 330% between 1996 and 
2005.59 Another study in 2008 found that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers spent approximately $4.8 billion on direct-to-consumer 
television, radio, magazine, and newspaper advertising.60 This 
burgeoning DTC advertising in America contrasts with nearly every 
other nation, as DTC advertising is highly restricted or illegal in every 
other country with the exception of New Zealand. 
In addition to paving the way for greater DTC advertising, the 
federal government has also loosened restrictions on so-called "off-
label" marketing. Prior to the FDA's approval of a drug, the company 
must prove that the drug is "safe and effective for its intended 
use(s)."61 When a drug is approved for a particular intended use, the 
drug's labeling must reflect only this use. Promotion of a drug for uses 
beyond those specified on the labeling is generally prohibited. This 
restriction on promoting drugs for off-label use helps ensure that all 
drugs pass through the proper procedures to be deemed appropriate 
for "safe and effective" use. 
                                                          
57 FDA, "Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements," April 
18, 2002, accessed March 17, 2011, 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125039.htm. 
58 Ibid. See also Steven A. Sheller, "Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: The Case for 
Regulation," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, April 9, 2004, 407. 
59 "Spending on Direct-to-Consumer Drug Ads Increased in Spite of Criticism, Study 
Finds," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, August 24, 2007, 888. 
60 Natasha Singer, "Citing Risks, Lawmakers Seek to Curb Drug Commercials," New 
York Times, July 27, 2009, 1. 
61 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006). 
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 Despite this general prohibition on promoting the off-label 
utilization of prescription drugs, however, the underlying federal 
statutory scheme recognizes the considerable medical benefits that 
can flow from the off-label use of drugs. For that reason, doctors and 
other health care professionals can legally prescribe drugs for off-label 
purposes. Indeed, for a number of drugs, this off-label prescribing is 
very common. One 2006 study found that more than 20% of 
prescriptions written for the most commonly used prescription drugs in 
the United States were prescribed for off-label use.62 The National 
Comprehensive Cancer Network estimates that between 50% and 75% 
of all uses of cancer drugs were off-label.63  
The public health benefits of off-label uses spurred lawmakers to 
reconsider the extent of the restrictions on the off-label promotion of 
prescription drugs. In the same year that the FDA issued its Guidance 
concerning DTC advertising, Congress enacted the FDA Modernization 
Act of 1997. This statute abolished the long-standing prohibition on 
drug manufacturers disseminating information related to "off-label" 
uses of their products to healthcare providers.64 While maintaining the 
general prohibition on off-label promotion, this statute allowed firms to 
provide doctors with information about how their drugs might be used 
to treat conditions for which the FDA had not approved. For example, 
the statute allows firms to disseminate peer-reviewed journal articles 
regarding off-label uses for their products. Doctors, as they had 
before, were still free to prescribe drugs for off-label uses. 
Balancing Priorities in Advertising 
Much like the debates about the proper pricing mechanism for 
prescription drugs under Medicaid, the conversation about 
pharmaceutical advertising was about how to best balance competing 
concerns. On the one hand, critics of loosening restrictions of 
prescription drug advertising have focused on the potentially negative 
effects such advertisements might have on consumers. Such critics 
have claimed that DTC advertisements are at best unnecessary and at 
                                                          
62 David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein, and Randall S. Stafford, "Off-Label Prescribing 
Among Office-Based Physicians," Archives of Internal Medicine 166:1021-1026 (2006). 
63 Vicki W. Girard, "Punishing Pharmaceutical Companies for Unlawful Promotion of 
Approved Drugs: Why the False Claims Act is the Wrong Rx," Journal of Health Care 
Law & Policy, 12:131 (2009). 
64 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-115), 111 Stat. 
2330. 
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worst completely misleading to consumers.65 In addition, by heavily 
promoting the use of brand-name drugs rather than generic 
equivalents, critics argued that DTC advertising may be partially 
responsible for driving up health care costs. For example, one 2000 
study examining drug inflation found that the fifty drugs most 
frequently advertised to consumers in 2000 were responsible for 
47.8% of the rise in retail spending on prescription drugs from 1999 to 
2000.66 Critics have also suggested that allowing companies to suggest 
the benefits of off-label use of their drugs to healthcare professionals 
risks subverting the entire system of FDA regulation. Because the FDA 
has not evaluated off-label uses of drugs, the increased use of off-label 
utilization may lead to the very sort of public health risks that 
necessitated stronger FDA regulation in the first place. 
 On the other hand, others have noted the public health benefits 
associated with DTC advertising and off-label drug utilization. DTC 
advertising, for example, may help patients realize that their condition 
is treatable and may spur medically helpful conversations with his or 
her doctor. Pharmaceutical firms have also been quick to point out 
evidence that DTC ads may improve health care by increasing patient 
compliance with their therapies.67 Further, allowing greater 
dissemination of information regarding off-label use can give doctors 
and their patients more options in their health care treatments. 
 The federal government has balanced these competing concerns 
by retaining certain restrictions on prescription drug advertising while 
also moving away from wholesale advertising prohibitions. The FDA 
Modernization Act of 1997 recognized a balance between the need to 
regulate new drug utilizations as well as the potential health benefits 
of off-label use, a balance generally shared by the FDA. Officials at the 
FDA have also noted that there is "no evidence that DTC promotion is 
harming the public health" by, for example, encouraging doctors to 
prescribe inappropriate medications.68 The FDA has thus taken a more 
                                                          
65 Amanda Gardner, "Direct-to-Consumer Ads Booming Despite Criticisms," Healthday 
Reporter, August 15, 2007. 
66 "Study Says Direct Consumer Ads Play Big Part in Increased Drug Spending," 
Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, November 29, 2001. 
67 "DTC Ads: Promoting Compliance a Win-Win Prospect," Pharmaceutical Executive 
(December 1999). 
68 Dana A. Elfin, "Drug Ads Don't Cause Improper Prescribing, Top FDA Official Tells 
Senate Subcommittee," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, July 26, 2001. 
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hands-off approach to DTC advertising, believing that the benefits of 
this advertising outweigh any of the potential negatives. 
 This hands-off approach has generated plenty of criticism in 
Congress and elsewhere. Testimony in one congressional panel in 
2001, for example, noted a more than 50% drop-off in overall FDA 
enforcement actions from 1997 to 2001.69 Another recent study also 
cited the decreasing FDA enforcement during the George W. Bush 
Administration, noting that the FDA had issued 142 warning letters in 
1997, but only 21 in 2006.70 Members of Congress also began 
criticizing the FDA's alleged lack of strong enforcement. Representative 
Henry Waxman (D-CA), a frequent critic of the pharmaceutical 
industry, issued a report in 2004 claiming that the FDA was guilty of 
"weak enforcement" of rules regarding "false and misleading" drug 
advertisements.71 Waxman's report demanded that the FDA 
Commissioner, Mark McClellan, explain why the FDA was not taking 
more aggressive enforcement actions. The Government Accountability 
Office released a report in 2006 raising similar concerns criticizing the 
FDA’s effectiveness in overseeing DTC advertising and in reducing 
consumers' exposure to false and misleading advertising.72 One theme 
running through these criticisms of the FDA was that the agency's 
alleged lack of oversight of DTC advertising and off-label uses had the 
effect of driving up the costs of health care by unnecessarily 
encouraging greater utilization of brand-name pharmaceuticals.73 
Multistate Litigation Concerning Pharmaceutical 
Advertising 
It was in this political context that state prosecutors became 
considerably more active in using litigation to challenge the way 
pharmaceutical companies market their products. As the examples 
below illustrate, this litigation has resulted in greater limits on drug 
marketing and has created new regulatory requirements for the 
settling firms to follow. Additionally, settlements between states and 
                                                          
69 Elfin, "Drug Ads Don't Cause." 
70 "Spending on Direct-to-Consumer Drug Ads Increased." 
71 "Waxman Report Says FDA Enforcement Of Misleading Advertising Rules 
Ineffective," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, February 6, 2004, 147. 
72 Bronwyn Davis, "Restrictions on DTC Drug Ads Needed To Protect Consumers, 
House Democrats Say," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, May 16, 2008, 576. 
73 Ziad F. Gellad, Kenneth W. Lyles, "Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of 
Pharmaceuticals," American Journal of Medicine 120: 475-480 (2007), 478. 
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drug firms have had the effect of expanding state regulatory oversight 
of the pharmaceutical industry. By adopting the arguments of drug 
advertising's critics and transforming them into a form of national 
regulation, state litigation has effectively altered the balance between 
competing concerns reached by federal regulators. 
Limiting DTC Advertising 
One of the states' first significant lawsuits concerning DTC 
advertising involved Pfizer's blockbuster antibiotic drug, Zithromax. 
Zithromax was (and is) approved by the FDA as a safe and effective 
treatment for childhood ear infections, and Pfizer marketed the drug 
for this purpose. In 2001, a coalition of nineteen states began 
investigating Pfizer's advertising of Zithromax out of concerns that 
some of the company's advertisements contained "false and deceptive" 
claims under state consumer protection statutes.  
The states claimed that while Pfizer's DTC advertising contained 
information regarding how many doses and how often Zithromax 
should be administered, it failed to disclose information about 
antibiotic resistance and other factors that physicians must consider 
before prescribing antibiotic treatment for ear infections. The states 
also claimed that Pfizer had misrepresented the efficacy of Zithromax 
in treating ear infections in comparison to other antibiotics on the 
market. In the words of Connecticut AG (now Senator) Richard 
Blumenthal, the states initiated this investigation because "[d]rug ads 
like Pfizer's must put health before hype...[p]arents deserve to know 
that the antibiotic won't work against viral infections, such as colds or 
the flu, and that excess or unnecessary medication leads to antibiotic 
resistant infections."74 
Pfizer, however, noted that it was marketing Zithromax 
consistently with all applicable federal laws as well as the FDA-
approved labeling for the product. In fact, Pfizer had voluntarily 
submitted the exact DTC advertisements challenged by the states to 
the FDA for review before Pfizer ran the ads, and the FDA had 
approved them. Once the DTC advertising was on the air, consistent 
                                                          
74 Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In the Matter of Pfizer Inc. (December 27, 
2002), ¶3; Connecticut Attorney General's Office, Press Release, "State Reaches 
Agreement With Pfizer On Advertisement Of Antibiotics," January 6, 2003, accessed 
March 17, 2012, http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=1778&Q=283978. 
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with the agency's approval of the ads, the FDA had taken no 
enforcement actions against Pfizer for its marketing of Zithromax. 
Nevertheless, the states’ legal theories rested on state 
consumer protection law, not federal labeling laws. The states claimed 
that under the laws of the nineteen states involved in the 
investigation, Pfizer's failure to disclose certain information and claims 
about the efficacy of the drug represented fraudulent 
misrepresentation and deceptive trade practices. Pfizer publically 
denied the states' claims, but faced with the prospect of a protracted 
and public litigation battle with a significant coalition of state 
prosecutors, Pfizer agreed to enter into a settlement with the states in 
December of 2002.  
The amount of monetary recovery involved in the settlement 
was a relatively small $6 million. Of this amount, Pfizer agreed to pay 
$4 million to the states to cover all investigatory costs and attorneys' 
fees. The remaining $2 million was to fund a public service 
announcement campaign over the next three years to educate parents 
about "the proper use of antibiotics" to treat childhood ear infections. 
The settlement also prohibited Pfizer from mentioning Zithromax 
specifically in any of these PSAs. To help enforce the provision, the 
states required Pfizer to submit a "written affirmation setting forth 
Pfizer's compliance" with these provisions to the nineteen signatory 
attorney general offices. 
Most importantly, the settlement also placed various restrictions 
on Pfizer's DTC advertising of Zithromax in the future. First, the 
settlement required Pfizer to cease the DTC ads that were the subjects 
of the investigation. Additionally, the settlement required Pfizer to 
make specific statements about Zithromax in all of its future 
advertisements for the product. For example, the settlement required 
Pfizer to including the following specific phase in their marketing: 
"Remember that antibiotics don't work for viral infections, such as a 
cold or flu, so don't insist on a prescription for an antibiotic. Only your 
doctor can decide what type of infection your child has and the best 
way to treat it." Finally, the settlement stated that if consumer ads for 
Zithromax refer to data in a scientific study related to dosing 
convenience, frequency of use or effectiveness, Pfizer must disclose 
whether the study was published, peer-reviewed, or funded by Pfizer. 
The company also must make available to consumers the full study or 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
2012 Midwest Political Science Conference, Chicago, IL, April 12-15, 2012, This article is © Midwest Political Science 
Association and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Midwest Political 
Science Association does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Midwest Political Science Association. 
31 
 
a summary of the study, and must post the study or a summary on its 
Internet site. Federal law or the FDA required none of these various 
disclosures and advertising changes. By requiring them in this 
settlement, however, the states wanted to send a "strong message" 
not only to Pfizer but also to the pharmaceutical industry generally 
that (in the words of New York AG Eliot Spitzer) "advertisements that 
mislead or fail to provide complete information about pharmaceutical 
products will meet with tough enforcement actions."75 
 The states followed up this watershed settlement with Pfizer 
with numerous additional multistate settlements with other major drug 
manufacturers. Several of these settlements have served as a vehicle 
to regulate pharmaceutical company behavior reaching beyond a 
single blockbuster drug. One such settlement involved Bayer 
Corporation and its cholesterol reduction drug Baycol. The FDA 
approved Baycol in 1997, but following its post-marketing studies 
Bayer learned that Baycol might lead to elevated instances of a rare 
but severe muscle disorder. After notifying the FDA about this 
possibility, Bayer voluntarily removed the product from the market 
four years later. Following the voluntary recall, thirty states began 
investigating Bayer in 2004. They claimed that while Bayer voluntarily 
notified the FDA about possible problems with Baycol and 
subsequently removed the FDA-approved product from the market, 
the company violated state consumer protection laws by failing to 
adequately warn prescribers and consumers about these problems 
with Baycol. 
The states saw in this case a way to reform the way in which 
pharmaceutical firms disclosed the results of internal clinical studies of 
drugs – an issue that was the contemporaneous subject of 
considerable debate in Congress.76 To that point, neither Congress nor 
the FDA placed requirements on companies to disclose the results of 
both positive and negative clinical drug studies, as federal law required 
                                                          
75 Office of the Attorney General of New York, Press Release, "Ads for Leading 
Antibiotic Found to Be Misleading," January 6, 2003, accessed March 17, 2012, 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2003/jan/jan06a_03.html. 
76 For example, Senators Ted Kennedy and Michael Enzi introduced the Enhancing 
Drug Safety and Innovation Act in 2006 that would have required the establishment of 
a publically available clinical trials database containing information about clinical trial 
results. Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2006 (S.3807, 109th Congress). 
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only limited clinical trial disclosures.77 The main reason for this inaction 
was because of concerns that releasing broader clinical trial data was 
both unnecessary and could stifle innovation by revealing sensitive 
business information. 
Through a settlement reached by several states and Bayer in 
January of 2007, however, states were able to achieve broader clinical 
trial requirements that industry critics in Congress had been unable to 
achieve. In addition to a payment of $8 million to the states to cover 
litigation expenses, the settlement required Bayer to register clinical 
trials of most of its prescription products, and post all results, not just 
those with positive outcomes.78 The states intended this settlement to 
serve as a stepping-stone for similar regulation of other large drug 
firms. "By agreeing to publicly disclose information on both positive 
and negative studies about the safety and efficacy of its drugs," 
Michigan AG Mike Cox stated, "Bayer has provided an important new 
direction for the entire pharmaceutical industry to follow."79 In addition 
to this important clinical trial provision, the settlement also required 
Bayer to comply fully with state laws regulating marketing, sale, and 
promotion of its pharmaceutical and biological products and from 
making "false and misleading" claims relating to any of its product sold 
in the United States.80 
Limiting the Dissemination of Off-Label Drug Information 
In addition to focusing on DTC advertising and alleged failures 
to warn consumers about potential prescription drug side effects, 
states have brought litigation against pharmaceutical companies 
concerning the off-label use of drugs. Much as in the pricing litigation, 
some of these cases have featured federal-state collaboration in 
enforcement to achieve significant regulatory settlements. In other 
                                                          
77 For example, policy advocates had achieved limited clinical trial disclosures in the 
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-115, § 113, 111 
Stat. 2296), which mandated the creation of a website (clinicaltrials.gov) providing the 
public with limited access to information regarding clinical trials for drugs developed to 
treat serious or life-threatening illnesses. 
78 See, for example, Final Judgment and Agreed Permanent Injunction, State of Texas 
v. Bayer Corporation (District Court of Dallas County, Texas, 2007),  ¶15-¶23. 
79 Drew Douglas, "Bayer Agrees to Pay $8 Million, Post Results Of Study to Resolve 
States’ Probe of Baycol," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, January 26, 2007, 
83. 
80Final Judgment and Agreed Permanent Injunction, State of Texas v. Bayer, ¶15. 
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cases, states have worked independently of federal enforcers to reach 
key settlements. 
An early example of federal-state collaboration in this area 
involved the governments' investigation into pharmaceutical giant 
Warner-Lambert's marketing of Neurontin, which ended in a major 
settlement in 2004. Neurontin was approved by the FDA specifically to 
treat epilepsy, though the drug proved highly effective in treating 
general pain, attention deficit disorder, and bipolar disease. These 
alternative uses, as well as the drug's use of use and relative lack of 
serious side effects, led to approximately 90% to 95% of Neurontin 
prescriptions used for off-label purposes. In 1996, however, a former 
employee of the company brought a whistleblower suit under the False 
Claims Act, alleging that the division of Warner-Lambert tasked with 
advertising the drug was marketing it for some of its many off-label 
uses. Federal and state prosecutors subsequently intervened in the 
case, alleging that Warner-Lambert had made false statements to 
government health programs and offered illegal kickbacks to 
prescribers, in the form of trips and falsely labeled consulting fees, to 
promote off-label uses of Neurontin. The governments also claimed 
that Warner-Lambert disseminated information to doctors about the 
off-label uses of the drug in such a way that it constituted illegal off-
label marketing. These off-label marketing violations, the governments 
claimed, led to the increased utilization of Neurontin under the 
Medicaid program, helping to drive up costs for the federal and state 
governments. 
The federal DOJ concentrated on the criminal allegations in the 
case and collaborated with the states concerning the civil Medicaid 
fraud aspects of the case, while the states activated not only their 
fraud enforcement personnel for this case but their consumer 
protection divisions as well. The states' consumer protection 
investigation focused on alleged violations of state consumer 
protection laws occurring when Warner-Lambert promoted the drug for 
off-label uses. These consumer protection claims rested upon 
innovative interpretations of existing law, raising questions both about 
the theories of causation employed in the case as well as constitutional 
concerns. For one, the government enforcers suggested that 
pharmaceutical companies could and should be held liable for false 
claims made to health care programs by providers because the 
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provider's prescription decisions were based upon information provided 
to them by the drug company, despite the fact that the company was 
likely unaware that any of these claims were made by the physicians.81 
Further, because the alleged communications by Warner-Lambert 
about off-label uses were in fact truthful, the claims also raised 
constitutional free speech issues. 
Warner-Lambert initially fought these claims in federal district 
court, but after losing a couple of key rulings at the motion to dismiss 
and summary judgment stages, the company opted to settle. The 
government prosecutors announced a $430 million settlement in May 
2004, representing the largest health care fraud recovery since the 
previously mentioned TAP Pharmaceuticals case in 2001. The bulk of 
the monetary recovery consisted of criminal fines paid to the federal 
government, though the settlement directed Warner-Lambert to pay 
federal and state Medicaid programs $190 million for losses allegedly 
incurred by the company's off-label marketing of Neurontin.  
On the same day as this broader settlement, forty-six states 
also entered into a separate but closely related settlement resolving 
their consumer protection claims. In addition to injunctive provisions 
aimed at baring Warner-Lambert from continuing its alleged off-label 
marketing, the multistate settlement established a new "Neurontin 
Multistate Executive Committee" headed by the attorneys general of 
California and North Carolina.82 This new committee would administer 
the new "Attorney General Consumer and Prescriber Education Grant 
Program" funded by a $21 million payment by Warner-Lambert, the 
purpose of which would be to fund programs around the country 
designed to educate physicians and patients about prescription drug 
marketing and other related issues. Governmental entities, academic 
institutions, and not-for-profit groups would be eligible to apply for 
grants from this program, which attorneys general on this committee 
would administer. An additional $6 million of the states' settlement 
was allocated to a "corrective advertisement campaign" regarding 
Neurontin to be run by Warner-Lambert, and $10 million went directly 
                                                          
81 Anderson and Stamp, "Shooting the Messenger," at 9. 
82 Order Governing the Administration of the Multistate Grant and Advertising 
Program, In the Matter of Warner-Lambert Company, LLC (Circuit Court, County of 
Marion, Oregon, 2004), ¶2.2 and ¶2.3. 
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to the participating attorney general offices to compensate them for 
investigation and litigation expenses. 
This early Warner-Lambert settlement served as a beachhead 
for numerous subsequent investigations of pharmaceutical companies’ 
off-label marketing strategies. This included a prominent state 
litigation campaign concerning Purdue Pharma’s powerful pain reliever 
OxyContin. After numerous criticisms from state officials that the FDA 
had "turned its back on its serious responsibility with regard to 
OxyContin" by allegedly ignoring how the company was persuading 
providers to prescribe more frequent doses of the drug than that 
approved by the FDA, state attorneys general took matters into their 
own hands. A lengthy investigation by twenty-six states resulted in a 
2007 settlement in which Purdue Pharma agreed to pay $19.5 million 
to the states as well as significantly reform its marketing practices. 
A recent multistate settlement concerning Eli Lilly's Zyprexa 
further illustrates the extent of regulatory provisions contained in 
these off-label marketing settlements. In 2007, several states sued Eli 
Lilly claiming that the company launched an "aggressive" marketing 
campaign in 2001 called "Viva Zyprexa!" in which the company 
illegally marketed the drug for a number of off-label uses beyond its 
FDA-approved use to treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.83 
According to the lawsuits, which were based upon state consumer law, 
Eli Lilly knew Zyprexa increased greatly the risk of diabetes, heart 
attacks, and other health problems, but nevertheless actively 
marketed it to doctors for use with patients who were not diagnosed 
with mental illness. The company then failed to warn consumers of the 
risks associated with the drug.84 
As have a number of companies facing similar off-label 
marketing lawsuits, Eli Lilly viewed the state lawsuits as a disservice to 
patients who had been successfully treated by the drug after receiving 
advice from their doctors. Eli Lilly also noted that all information they 
provided to health care professionals was truthful, not "false and 
misleading." Nevertheless, facing a growing number of state lawsuits 
concerning the drug, the company entered into an agreement with 
                                                          
83 Andrew Ballard, "Eli Lilly to Pay States $62 Million Under Zyprexa Marketing 
Settlement," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, October 10, 2008, 1153. 
84 Sherry Jones, "Montana AG Joins Others in Suing Eli Lilly Over Marketing of 
Zyprexa," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, March 16, 2007, 264. 
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thirty-two states to resolve the investigation in 2008. The $62 million 
settlement, then a record monetary recovery for a multistate 
consumer protection case, placed a variety of regulatory restrictions 
on the company. Among other requirements, the settlement barred Eli 
Lilly from giving product samples of Zyprexa to health care providers 
whose specialties are not consistent with Zyprexa’s label or from using 
any grant funds to promote the drug.85 The settlement also required 
Eli Lilly's medical staff, rather than its marketing staff, to have the 
ultimate responsibility for the medical content of medical letters and 
references regarding Zyprexa. In addition to these regulatory 
provisions governing internal company operations, the agreement also 
required a significant amount of new disclosures, including information 
about grants received, lists of "promotional speakers and consultants 
who were paid more than $100 for promotional speaking and/or 
consulting," and the results of the company's clinical trials. Echoing a 
number of his colleagues, Florida AG Bill McCollum described 
agreement as a "landmark settlement [that] sends the message that 
pharmaceutical companies will be held responsible for their actions, 
including any inappropriate marketing practices which may promote 
off-label uses that have not been approved."86 
Establishing Greater Government Oversight of 
Advertising 
In addition to establishing stricter marketing practices and 
disclosures on companies than federal law requires, several of recent 
multistate settlements has used state consumer protection law as a 
legal hook to create greater government oversight of a broad range of 
pharmaceutical advertising in the future. In one settlement involving 
Merck's blockbuster arthritis drug Vioxx, the states essentially 
provided themselves to power to enforce provisions of the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act – a power that is nowhere in the statute itself. 
Merck voluntarily recalled Vioxx from the market in 2004 after a 
study the company sponsored found that the drug nearly doubled the 
                                                          
85 Oregon Department of Justice, "AG Reaches §62 Million Settlement with Eli Lilly 
Pharmaceutical," October 7, 2008, accessed March 21, 2011, 
http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/2008/rel100708.shtml. 
86 Ballard, "Eli Lilly to Pay States." 
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risk of a heart attack and stroke.87 Shortly after the Vioxx recall, 
several states began investigating Merck's marketing of the drug, 
claiming that since 1999 the company waged an aggressive direct-to-
consumer advertising campaign that misrepresented the safety of 
Vioxx and concealed increased risks associated with the product's use. 
These claims, again based upon state consumer protection law, were 
resolved in what was then the largest consumer protection case 
against a pharmaceutical company (prior to the Eli Lilly case 
settlement noted above). 
The settlement included a substantial $58 million monetary 
payment to twenty-nine states, but as with many other consumer 
protection settlements, the most important part of the settlement was 
its regulatory provisions. As with the Eli Lilly Zyprexa settlement, the 
states required Merck to adhere to a number of new procedures 
relating to the disclosure of clinical trials and potential conflicts of 
interest.88 The settlement also included a number of provisions 
requiring anyone named on a Merck-sponsored study to adhere to a 
variety of authorship conditions before their names can appear on the 
study. This provision was meant to address controversies over so-
called "ghostwriting" in the industry, in which companies would 
allegedly pay authors to put their names on independent research that 
was instead actually conducted by the pharmaceutical company. 
Certain guidelines regarding these practices had been suggested by 
the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors,89 but before 
this settlement had not been required by any law or regulation in the 
United States. This settlement provision, however, essentially adopted 
the guidelines promulgated by this International Committee and 
turned them into an affirmative requirement that Merck had to follow. 
In addition to these regulatory requirements, the settlement 
also contained provisions increasing the authority of the FDA to 
oversee Merck's advertising. According to the settlement, Merck must 
submit its television commercials to the FDA for approval before any 
                                                          
87 Drew Douglas, "Merck Will Pay $58 Million to Settle States' Probe Into Marketing of 
Vioxx," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, May 23, 2008, 611. 
88 Stipulated General Judgment, State of Oregon v. Merck & Co. (Circuit Court for the 
County of Marion, Oregon, 2008). 
89 International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, "Uniform Requirements for 
Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Writing and Editing for Biomedical 
Publication," accessed March 11, 2012, http://www.icmje.org/2008_urm.pdf. 
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DTC advertisements are broadcast, further requiring the company to 
comply with any FDA recommendation to delay advertising for new 
pain medications. In a subsequent settlement with Merck over another 
of its drugs, Vytorin, states extended this pre-clearance provision to 
cover all of Merck's products, not just the drugs involved in the 
investigations.90 These provisions mirrored several of the unsuccessful 
attempts of congressional supporters to require FDA pre-approval of 
DTC advertisements.91 
In addition to increasing FDA oversight of Merck's DTC 
advertising, the Vioxx settlement also essentially granted the power to 
states to enforce federal law. In the settlement, Merck agreed to 
refrain from making "false, misleading or deceptive" promotional 
claims as defined under state law, as well as to comply with the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and FDA regulations in connection with 
advertising and promotion. Merck was already under an affirmative 
obligation to adhere to federal law and regulations or face potential 
penalties from federal enforcers, but this provision allowed the state 
attorneys general to oversee Merck's compliance with federal law as 
well. Particularly since so many states had criticized the FDA's 
performance in regulating pharmaceutical firms, this provided them 
with additional leverage to forge ahead with the enforcement of federal 
law even where the FDA has "failed" to do so. 
One problem with the Vioxx settlement from the states' 
perspective was that despite granting themselves additional ability to 
enforce existing federal law, states still relied on the FDA to "properly" 
review the DTC advertising the settlement required Merck to submit 
before running the advertisements. The states solved this problem in a 
subsequent settlement with Pfizer in October 2008 supplementing their 
capacity to pre-clear DTC advertisements. This settlement resolved 
thirty-three states' investigation of Pfizer's alleged off-label marketing 
of a pair of Pfizer's drugs, Celebrex and Bextra.92 The $60 million 
settlement included many of the same disclosure and conflicts of 
                                                          
90 Susanne Pagano, "Merck, Schering-Plough Settle With States Over Vytorin Study 
Release," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, July 17, 2009, 821. 
91 See, for example, Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2007 (S.484, 110th 
Congress); Food and Drug Administration Safety Act of 2007 (S.468, 110th Congress). 
92 Final Consent Judgment, State of New Jersey v. Pfizer Inc. (Superior Court of New 
Jersey, No. MER-C-134-08). As with a number of these cases, the FDA chose not to 
investigate Pfizer's alleged off-label marketing of these drugs. 
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interest requirements that several previous settlements had, and 
became the second multistate settlement to include a requirement that 
a company receive pre-clearance of all of its DTC advertisements 
before broadcasting them. Unlike the Merck settlement, however, the 
Pfizer settlement required the company to report to the participating 
state attorneys general if the FDA did not act within a certain amount 
of time. The settlement also required Pfizer to provide the states with 
all of the DTC advertising information that the company provided to 
the FDA. Essentially, then, this provision created a two-layered 
enforcement regime that simultaneously expanded the FDA's authority 
while granting the states additional information with which to enforce 
their new pre-clearance regulation if the FDA for whatever reason did 
not act to enforce it. 
Litigation as Drug Advertising Regulation 
The increase in the number of investigations brought by states 
targeting the marketing activities of pharmaceutical in recent years is 
matched by the growing extensiveness of the regulations contained 
within the settlements resolving the investigations. Table 2 
summarizes several of the states' major multistate consumer 
protection advertising cases brought against pharmaceutical firms in 
recent years.93  
TABLE 2: MULTISTATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LITIGATION  
AGAINST PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS (THROUGH 2009) 
 
States Defendant Product Year 
Settled 
Significant Settlement Terms 
19 
states 
Pfizer Zithromax 2003 $6 million; specific alterations to 
advertisements 
46 
states 
Warner-
Lambert 
Neurontin 2004 $38 million; corrective 
advertisements 
30 
states 
Bayer Baycol 2007 $8 million; disclosure of clinical 
trial results 
26 
states 
Purdue 
Pharma 
OxyContin 2007 $19.5 million; various marketing 
restrictions and disclosure 
requirements 
                                                          
93 Note that Table 2 includes only multistate cases, and not industry settlements 
reached by individual states. 
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33 
states 
Pfizer Celebrex; 
Bextra 
2008 $60 million; pre-clearance 
provisions, clinical trial 
disclosures 
32 
states 
Eli Lily Zyprexa 2008 $62 million; various disclosures 
and marketing requirements 
29 
states 
Merck Vioxx; 
Zocor; 
Pepcid 
2008 $58 million; pre-clearance 
provisions, bans on 
"ghostwriting" 
35 
states 
Merck Vytorin 2009 $5.4 million; pre-clearance 
provisions, disclosure of clinical 
trial results, various conflict-of-
interest regulations 
27 
states 
Bayer Yaz 2009 $20 million; pre-clearance 
provision, corrective 
advertisement campaign 
 
By achieving settlement after settlement with some of the 
nation's largest pharmaceutical firms, states have managed to step 
into the role of Congress and the FDA by establishing stricter 
marketing restrictions on industry than anything required by federal 
statutes or regulations. In a few short years, states have managed to 
implement strict rules concerning disclosure of clinical trial results, 
new conflict of interest regulations, specific requirements companies 
must follow when advertising their products, and requirements that 
companies receive pre-clearance before running any DTC 
advertisements.  
While these provisions technically only apply to the companies 
party to a particular settlement, they provide a new regulatory 
baseline the entire industry must follow to be certain that they will not 
be subject to potentially expensive multistate investigations that could 
harm their public image. This is why the states' frequent talk about 
these settlements "sending a message" to the entire pharmaceutical 
industry is not mere bluster. Indeed, the impact of the settlements 
even beyond the significant consequences for the individual companies 
involved in the agreements is apparent when the pharmaceutical 
industry peak association adopted new voluntary guidelines aiming to 
help avoid liability for its members. These guidelines were mirrored 
after recent multistate settlements.94 
                                                          
94 For example, see "PhRMA Issues Drug Advertising Guidelines, But Some Want 
Moratorium, Firmer Oversight," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, August 5, 
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Through their investigations and settlements, state prosecutors 
have built themselves up as a sort of miniature FDA on the state level. 
Even as Congress and the FDA generally viewed DTC and off-label 
marketing generally in a positive light, adopting policies loosening 
advertising restrictions on drug firms, the states have pursued 
precisely the opposite policy agenda through a series of regulatory 
settlements. Relying heavily on state consumer protection law, states 
have been able to redefine the responsibilities of the pharmaceutical 
industry nationwide in relation to the marketing of their products. 
Despite facing no such requirements in federal statutes or regulations, 
several companies must now abide by the provisions of multistate 
settlements, including new disclosure requirements and preclearance 
provisions. Further, the states have used these settlements to extend 
government regulatory oversight over drug company advertisements 
into the future and build up their own enforcement capacity. The new 
requirements that the FDA pre-clear DTC advertisements granted the 
FDA powers the agency did not even seek out for itself. While helping 
to build up the FDA's regulatory power, the states also built up their 
own. The Vioxx and Vytorin settlements, for example, gave the states 
the ability to enforce federal laws and regulations against Merck. The 
Celebrex and Bextra settlements contained provisions giving states 
more tools to monitor industry compliance with their new regulations. 
This action by states allowed another avenue for critics of the 
drug industry to press their claims. After failing to recalibrate the 
balance of concerns established by Congress and the FDA in these 
areas, state prosecutions served as an opportunity point to achieve 
these regulatory changes in a different venue. What is more, this 
method of policymaking has been able to not only sidestep the broader 
national debate about drug regulation, but it has also been able to 
sidestep some important constitutional issues as well. Attempts in 
Congress to require drug companies to pre-clear their advertisements 
with the FDA before broadcast have generally failed, largely because of 
                                                          
2005, 823; "International Pharma Trade Group Adopts New Code Barring Some 
Marketing Activities," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, January 5, 2007, 16; "Rx 
Industry Group Issues New Guidelines For Companies on Direct-to-Consumer Ads," 
Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, December 12, 2008, 1382. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
2012 Midwest Political Science Conference, Chicago, IL, April 12-15, 2012, This article is © Midwest Political Science 
Association and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Midwest Political 
Science Association does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere 
without the express permission from Midwest Political Science Association. 
42 
 
concerns that any such legislation or agency regulations would be 
unconstitutional restraints on speech.95 
The preclearance provisions established by the states get 
around this constitutional constraint by placing the preclearance 
requirement in an out-of-court settlement. Because the states' 
preclearance provision is the result of an "agreement" between the 
states and the involved companies, it is not vulnerable to the same 
sort of constitutional challenges that a congressional enactment or 
agency regulation would be. After all, if the company agreed to abide 
by this provision, how could it then turn around and claim that it is 
unconstitutional? As indicated throughout this dissertation, however, 
companies often do not agree with the legal theories employed by the 
states but nevertheless feel compelled to sign settlements to reduce 
their own risk and uncertainty. Merck, for example, objected to 
preclearance provisions as unconstitutional prior restraints before 
ultimately acceding to them in order to resolve all of the government 
litigation surrounding the drug. Essentially, the states have discovered 
a way to leverage state judicial power to force settlements, but 
simultaneously shield the regulations contained therein from 
constitutional challenge by placing them in an out-of-court 
"agreement." 
Conclusion 
The recent rise of state pharmaceutical litigation is important for 
several reasons. For one, underlying this litigation is a new style of 
policymaking that has not received the attention it deserves. While 
state prosecutors typically characterize their lawsuits and 
investigations as "law enforcement," the reality is that these litigation 
campaigns go beyond merely "enforcing" the law and instead give 
prosecutors the opportunity to redefine corporate responsibilities. In 
conjunction with the federal DOJ and private litigants, state litigation 
redefined the "AWP" pricing mechanism used in government health 
care programs as "fraudulent" despite the industry relying upon this 
pricing structure for years. State litigation also cracked down on two of 
the chief ways in which pharmaceutical firms promote their products 
                                                          
95 Natasha Singer, "Citing Risks, Lawmakers Seek to Curb Drug Commercials," New 
York Times, July 27, 2009, B1.For example, see Representative Jerrold Nadler's (D-
NY) comments in ibid. (''On First Amendment grounds, I am not going to say we will 
ban'' drug advertising). 
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by litigating a host of DTC and off-label advertising cases, using this 
litigation as a vehicle for regulatory requirements not required under 
federal law.  
The goal of these lawsuits was generally not to win in court, but 
rather to achieve large settlements with key members of the drug 
industry. In addition to large monetary payouts, these settlements 
have contained a variety of provisions adding additional regulatory 
requirements on the industry going beyond that required by 
congressional enactments and agency policy. By resolving these 
disputes by means less formal than active litigation in court, this 
settlement process amounts to "bargaining in the shadow of the 
law."96 Particularly interesting, however, is that "the law" casting a 
shadow over the process is typically state law, including state False 
Claims Acts as well as state antitrust and consumer protection 
statutes. While state law casts the shadow in this bargaining process, 
the result is new policy dictating new regulatory requirements that 
apply nationwide, settlement by settlement, to one of the United 
States’ largest industries.  
In some ways, achieving policy results through settlements is 
even more powerful than those reached by the typical lawmaking or 
regulatory process, because they are immune from judicial review. 
This is a particularly important benefit to regulation reached through 
out-of-court settlements, given the shaky legal ground of many of 
these lawsuits. The contention that AWP was "fraudulent" faced a 
number of legal problems, including the fact that doctors, not 
pharmaceutical firms, actually benefited from the AWP spread, as well 
as the fact that governments knew for years that AWP really meant 
"Ain't What's Paid." Attempts to regulate drug advertising – either by 
requiring pre-clearance of DTC advertising or by restricting companies' 
ability to distribute truthful information about their drugs to physicians 
– raises important free speech issues arising under the First 
Amendment. By lodging their regulation of the pharmaceutical industry 
in out-of-court settlements, states have sidestepped potential legal 
challenges to these provisions. Ironically, then, states have 
simultaneously leveraged the judicial power to force new regulations 
                                                          
96 Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce," Yale Law Journal, Apr. 1979. 
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through settlements, but then insulated these regulations from future 
review by courts. 
Further, this litigation illustrates how it is important to tie in 
legal actions to the broader political climate. Using litigation and 
settlements to achieve stricter regulatory oversight of pharmaceutical 
firm activities occurred only after advocates of policy change failed to 
make these changes in Congress. This failure moved the action to 
different venues in the America separation of powers system – both 
horizontally towards courts and litigation and vertically to the states. 
As litigators on the state level, state prosecutors are perfectly 
positioned as an alternative policy venue to take advantage of the 
demand for policy change.  
The state prosecutors frequently claim to be acting only because 
of alleged congressional and federal agency "inaction," but it is worth 
noting that this "inaction" on the federal level was actually a conscious 
decision to balance the regulatory regime in a manner different than 
what the litigators sought. Congress, for example, did not alter the 
AWP payment system because of concerns that lower payments to 
health care providers would serve to stop providing Medicaid services. 
Congress and the FDA alike maintained a looser regulatory approach 
to DTC advertising and off-label marketing because of the belief that 
these marketing efforts could have positive health benefits. By 
achieving settlements that, piece by piece, served to place stricter 
regulations on the industry, states effectively recalibrated the balance 
of concerns previously achieved by federal institutions. 
It should also be noted that in addition to altering the regulatory 
landscape, state litigation and settlements helped to alter the political 
landscape as well. After years of refusing to substantially change the 
AWP formula for drug reimbursements, Congress did an about-face 
following the success of the Bayer and TAP settlements and the wave 
of state litigation that followed. Building upon the existing federal and 
state investigations, an increasing number of members of Congress 
decided to respond with their own investigations.97 Indeed, key 
congressional committees sought and incorporated information from 
                                                          
97 "House Committee Questions Drugmakers In Expanded Medicaid Fraud Investigation," 
Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, July 4, 2003, 711. 
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these lawsuits as part of their own congressional investigations.98 After 
decades of acknowledging the AWP payment system as accepted 
practice, Congress held at least two hearings on the problem of pricing 
"fraud" following the federal and multistate Bayer and TAP settlements 
and subsequent individual state litigation.99 
Ultimately, Congress increasingly accepted the view of AWP-as-
fraud and ratified the settlements achieved by federal and state 
prosecutors. Congress codified the new ASP benchmark – created and 
defined in the Bayer and TAP settlements and subsequent state 
complaints – in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003. In essence, this was acquiescing to the 
national changes in pharmaceutical pricing that the states were 
already achieving, settlement by settlement, through their litigation.  
Congress made several policy changes following the states' 
other multistate pharmaceutical litigation campaigns as well. 
Congress's subsequent ratification of a number of the regulatory 
disclosure requirements resulting from the states' consumer protection 
settlements, such as regarding the results of internal clinical trials, 
applied these provisions to the entire industry.100 Further, state 
litigation has forced the industry peak association to reevaluate its own 
guidelines for its members, providing vindication for attorneys general 
who wished for their settlements with individual industry leaders to 
"send a message" to the broader industry. 
Understanding policymaking in a fragmented political system 
like the United States involves a great number of subtleties and 
complexities, as the state litigation campaigns against pharmaceutical 
companies indicate. However, this complexity should not deter close 
examinations of the interactions between different political actors in 
the making of public policy. Policy failures at one venue may spur a 
transformation of the means of policy creation at another. This is 
                                                          
98 "Grassley Asks DOJ for Confidential Information From Medicaid Investigations," 
Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, May 28, 2004, 604. 
99 Medicare Drug Reimbursements: A Broken System for Patients and Taxpayers, Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health and the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, September 21, 2001 (No 107-65); Medicaid Prescription Drug 
Reimbursement: Why the Government Pays Too Much, Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, December 7, 2004 (No. 108-126). 
100 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(3)(D) 
(expanding required clinical trial disclosures by pharmaceutical firms). 
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precisely what has happened with the growth of state litigation in 
recent years, in pharmaceutical litigation and beyond. State litigation 
is particularly a rich area for exploration because it involves both the 
horizontal aspects of fragmentation (interactions of the courts, 
Congress, and administrative agencies) as well as the vertical 
interactions (states and the federal government). As state litigators 
continue to make headlines and aggressively target the federal 
government and private corporations alike in their lawsuits and 
investigations, it is all the more important for scholars to continue 
exploring the implications of this emerging activity for the broader 
American political system. 
